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ment over (the defendant's) land by prescription is
sanctioned by public policy."1 Though the granting of
a prescriptive easement is determinative of a corresponding
loss or forfeiture of right by another, there is no great
hardship in a rule which dictates that the owner of a
servient tenement may not successfully sleep on his rights.
This is especially apparent in those states in which the
prescriptive period is quite long, as in Maryland. There
can be little quarrel with the rule that long-continued
peaceful enjoyment of property rights should not be disturbed, and with direct rather than fictional justification
for its application.

AWARD OF ALIMONY AGAINST NON-RESIDENT
DEFENDANT HAVING PROPERTY
WITHIN STATE
Keen v. Keen'
A recent case, Keen v. Keen, has provided us with the
first interpretation of the Maryland statute authorizing
the award of alimony against a non-resident who is alleged
to have property within the state.' That this should be
the first time during the forty years in which the statute
has been in effect, that the Court of Appeals has been
called upon to interpret and apply it is somewhat surprising in the light of the voluminous amount of legal controversy that has arisen over the validity and application
of similar statutes in other states. As to the validity of
the basic principle embodied in such a statute, there is
little or no conflict of views throughout the United States;
it is in the application thereof that the difficulty and the
variance of views arise, due especially to the language of
each individual act and the procedure to be followed thereunder.
Mrs. Keen in 1946, seeking a divorce a mensa on the
ground of desertion, filed her bill of complaint wherein
permanent alimony, alimony pendente lite, and counsel
fee were also prayed. The bill alleged that her husband
was now believed to be a non-resident of Maryland; service
11Supra, n. 1, 139; Lehigh Valley R. R. Co. ,v. McFarlan, supra, n. 7; Board
of Education, etc. v. Nichol, 70 Ohio App. 467, 46 N. E. 2d 872 (1942).
'60 A. 2d 200 (Md. 1948).
Md. Code (1939) Axt. 16, Sec. 16.
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by publication followed. A decree pro confesso having been
passed, the Circuit Court for Wicomico County subsequently on August 30, 1946, passed a decree divorcing the
appellee from the appellant, and ordering him to pay her
the sum of $500 a month, plus counsel fees of the appellee.
During this period no appearance was filed by or on behalf
of the appellant. However, in November of 1946, counsel
for the appellant entered what he called a special appearance for the defendant, and on the same day entered an
appeal, though it was later dismissed. On June 6, 1947, the
appellant filed a petition wherein he asked that the case be
reopened and that he be allowed to file an answer, crossexamine witnesses and produce witnesses of his own. The
appellant subsequently filed a motion to strike out the
decree, contending that he was a non-resident upon whom
no personal service had ever been made prior to the time
of entering the decree, and that hence he had never been
within the jurisdiction of the court. This motion was overruled and on November 19, 1947, the appeal in the instant
case was filed.
As was stated in the bill of complaint, the appellant and
the appellee were owners as tenants by the entireties of
real estate in Wicomico County, most of which was then
encumbered by a mortgage. They also owned jointly some
War Savings Bonds, and it was further alleged that the
appellant, then residing in Delaware, received as a salesman a salary of about $22,000 yearly. No property of the
appellant in Maryland was ever brought under the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court by way of attachment, sequestration, or injunction prior to the passage of the decree
of divorce with alimony. The issue presented to the Court
of Appeals, therefore, was whether Section 16 of Article
16 authorized the entry of such a decree in personam, not
specifically restricted to collection from property already
under the jurisdiction of the court.
Statutes such as the one involved here are found in
the great majority of states, dating back in their modern
form, at least eighty years. The public policy embodied
in such a law was well stated in the Vermont case of
Wilder v. Wilder,8 wherein the Court said, ". . . it does not
follow that the jurisdiction of the person of the petitionee
in such proceedings is essential to the validity of an order
affecting his property found within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, or the power of the court to enforce
its orders within such jurisdiction. If this were so, it would
a93

Vt. 105, 106 A. 562 (1919).
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be possible for the deserting husband, though possessed
of visible property in abundance within the control of the
court, to cross the state line, and in security, laugh at the
inability of the law to afford relief to the abandoned wife
and children. But the courts are not thus powerless to
act. Means are available by which they can reach out and
lay hands on the recreant husband's property, and appro''
priate it to the support of the dependent wife and child. ,a
The rule supported by the weight of authority is that
one of the requisites to a valid decree for alimony or
maintenance, enforceable against the property which is
within the jurisdiction of the court, of a non-resident husband who is served only constructively, and who does not
appear, is that there must be something in the suit which
makes it in effect a proceeding against the property; in
other words, something which will serve to characterize
it as a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, as by description
thereof in the petition and prayer for relief against the
same, seizure of the property, injunction, receivership, etc.;
that otherwise the decree cannot be enforced against property which the defendant may then have, or which he
may thereafter acquire, within the jurisdiction of the
court. In its opinion the Court of Appeals drew from a
case which constitutes a landmark in the field of Conflict
of Laws, viz., Pennoyer v. Neff, 4 decided in 1878 by the
Supreme Court of the United States. Under an Oregon
statute a money judgment had been rendered against a
non-resident upon whom the only service of process had
been by publication, no appearance having been entered
by the defendant. Execution was issued on the judgment,
and certain property was sold, although the property previously thereto never had been brought within the jurisdiction of the court. The Supreme Court held the money
judgment void, saying, "Substituted service . . . may be
sufficient to inform parties of the object of the proceedings
taken, where property is once brought under the control
of the court by seizure or some equivalent act . . . But
where the entire object of the action is to determine the
personal rights and obligations of the defendants, that is
where the suit is merely in personam, constructive service
in this form upon a non-resident is ineffectual for any
purpose."",, Some thirty years ago the constitutionality of
such a statute as ours was challenged in the case of Penn:a Supra, n. 3, 106 A. 562, 563.
95 U. S. 714 (1877).
'

Supra, n. 4, 727.
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ington v. FourthNational Bank,5 an Ohio case which eventually went up to the Supreme Court, the non-resident husband contended that the action of the Ohio court was a
violation of due process. After the wife had filed her bill
seeking divorce and alimony, the court enjoined the bank,
wherein the non-resident husband had an account, from
paying out any money to him. Service was by publication
only. The Supreme Court, acknowledging that the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution does
not abridge the jurisdiction which a state possesses over
property within its borders, regardless of the owner's
presence, dismissed as without legal significance the husband's contention that in this type of suit no obligation
to pay alimony arose until culmination of the suit, and
that therefore the court had no power to enjoin disbursement until liability for alimony had been conclusively adjudicated. The Court said, "The only essentials to the exercise of the State's power are presence of the res within
its borders, its seizure at the commencement of proceedings,
and the opportunity of the owner to be heard. Where these
essentials exist, a decree for alimony against an absent
defendant will be valid under the same circumstances and
to the same extent as if the judgment were on a debtthat is, it will be valid not in personam, but as a charge
to be satisfied out of the property seized."6 The Court
further held that the injunction which issued against the
bank was as effective a seizure as the customary garnishment or taking on trustee process. The manner in which a
court lays hands upon the property within the state is
regulated by local law, and now that the constitutionality
of this type of statute has been established, subsequent
decisions-and they are many-have been confined to determining whether or not the steps taken under such laws
are in conformity with the procedural due process as outlined in the Pennington case.
In 1936 the New York Court of Appeals handed down,
in Geary v. Geary,' a decision which develops with admirable clarity the type of procedural due process that is constitutionally requisite. A resident wife was granted a
decree of separation and an order to the non-resident defendant to pay her each month $3000 for her support and
the support of her two minor children. After service by
publication had been effected, an order of sequestration
6243

U. S. 269 (1917).
0Supra, n. 5, 272.
'272 N. Y. 390,6 N. E. 2d 67 (1936).
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was later passed, and a receiver appointed to take charge
of the defendant's property within New York; the final judgment continued this receiver in control of the property.
The defendant contended that because publication was
made prior to the order placing his property in the hands
of the receiver, the court lacked jurisdiction to subject the
property to the payment of alimony, on the theory that
possession of specific property constituting a res is the foundation of jurisdiction in an action in rem. This contention
was rejected, however, the Court saying, "A matrimonial
action often has a dual aspect. In one aspect it is substantially a proceeding in rem, since its purpose is to'alter the
matrimonial status of the parties; in the other aspect it is
a proceeding in personam since its purpose is to compel
a defendant to perform his obligation to furnish his wife
and children with support."' t And further, "The rule ...
that seizure must precede assumption of jurisdiction by
the court in the action applies only to the assumption of
jurisdiction in the action upon rights in the defendant's
property.... [No violation of due process occurs] . . . so
long as under the New York statute seizure must precede
inquiry or adjudication as to the award of alimony, or the
application of property of the defendant to the payment
of such an award so that the defendant may have the oppor'
It is therefore clear
tunity to be heard upon that inquiry. ' ?b
now that to obtain jurisdiction to render such a judgment,
it is constitutionally necessary that the property be attached or otherwise proceeded against before rendition of
the judgment.
The rule in many jurisdictions seems to be that attachment or actual seizure of the property at the beginning or
during the pendency of the suit for alimony or maintenance is not essential to the court's jurisdiction to render
a decree therefor, on substituted service against a nonresident who does not appear, provided some other method
of proceeding against the property is taken in the case.
Thus in many states, among them Wyoming, Arkansas,
Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, North Carolina, Ohio and Vermont,
where an award against specifically described property
has been sought, the proceeding has frequently been regarded as one in rem or quasi in rem, so as to give the
court jurisdiction over the property, even though the nonresident husband has not been personally served.8 Of
7. Supra, n. 7, 71.

b Supra, n. 7, 72.
' 29 A. L. R. 92.
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course, even in these states a mere general allegation in
the petition of ownership of land within the state will not
suffice. Probably one of the reasons which prompt these
courts to adopt a less stringent procedure in the matter
is the belief that according to the common experience of
mankind, the owner of property keeps some oversight of
it, wherever situated, and will probably be apprised of
the seizure thereof, and so warned of the purpose of the
seizure. Thus in the case of Wesner v. O'Brien,9 the Court
held that mere particular description of the land in the bill
of complaint and in the published notice was sufficient, saying that seizure of land in such a case is little more than
a form; that the essential matter is that the defendant
shall have legal notice of the proposed appropriation, and
that this was afforded by the published notice. From the
standpoint of practical remedy, it is said, it would be futile
to require seizure of land which cannot be removed from
the jurisdiction. However, other states, such as Missouri,
Georgia, New York, and now Maryland, too, take the view
that mere description of the property and a prayer for
awarding alimony therefrom are not sufficient. In many
instances, however, this conflict of authority can be directly
attributed to the variance among the different statutes.
The Pennington case" illustrated the use of an injunction as a means of bringing a non-resident's property under
the jurisdiction of the court. The taking of the property
under control of a receiver appointed for that purpose has
been held such seizure as to impress upon the action the
character of a proceeding in rem, so as to render the property liable for a judgment for alimony, based on constructive service. Thus in the case of Rhoades v. Rhoades," a
temporary receiver was appointed at the beginning of the
action, who took possession of the land in controversy and
collected the rents and profits therefrom. The Court held
there that this was a sufficient seizure of the property to
bring it within the control of the court at the time of the
rendition of the judgment. At various times it has been
contended that filing the bill of complaint itself operated
as a lis pendens against the property, but in the present
case before the Court of Appeals such a contention was
expressly repudiated. The Court relied on Feigley v. Feigley,' 2 an old Maryland case wherein a divorce and alimony
were sought. The Court there said, "The doctrine of lis
'56 Kan. 724, 44 P. 1090 (1896).
1
Supra, n. 5.
78 Neb. 495, 111 N. W. 122 (1907).
27 Md. 537 (1855).
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pendens has no application whatever to this case. Lis pendens is a proceeding directly relating to the thing or property in question.""2a The Virginia Court has taken a similar
view in Bray v. Landergren," saying that a lis pendens,
filed in a divorce suit, was not a seizure, but was only a
warning to others who might have dealings with the property that their rights would depend upon the judgment in
the pending action.
Had counsel for Mr. Keen in the present case not filed
an order for an appeal and not filed a petition for reopening
the case, Mr. Keen would not have become subject to the
jurisdiction of the Wicomico County court. The Court of
Appeals unequivocally held that the judgment for alimony was void because, there having been no personal
service upon him, no attempt was made, either to limit
its application to property within the State, or to limit its
application to property which had been previously seized
in order to give the court jurisdiction over it. The Court
further held, however, that by filing an order for an appeal
the defendant had made a general appearance and submitted himself to the lower court's jurisdiction, for as it
said, "An appeal from a decree covers all questions which
may be involved in that decree, and is not confined to those
provisions which the appellant may contend are void."' 4
The appellant's fatal error in attempting to file a special
appearance in order to take an appeal from the decree
proved a costly one, and could have been avoided had a
special appearance been made only to move for striking
out of the decree, on jurisdictional grounds. Of course,
subsequently filing a petition to reopen the case removed
all doubt as to whether the appellant had subjected himself
to the jurisdiction of the Wicomico court.
Hence, we have at last definite interpretation of Section
16, one that should eliminate most doubt thereon in future
application of the statute. As the Court said, ". . . a court
has jurisdiction to seize property belonging to a non-resident defendant before a decree is passed, and can then pass
its decree directing that such property or its proceeds shall
be applied to the payment of alimony."'" Where, as in the
Keen case, the property is held by the entireties and a
divorce a mensa is sought, the proper procedure would
seem to be, as the Court said by way of dicta, to grant a
I"Supra, n. 12, 563.

1 161 Va. 699, 172 S. Pl. 252 (1934).
SU'upra, n. 1, 205.
I Ibid.
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receivership over such property during the pendency of
the proceedings for the purpose of collecting the rents and
income and eventually applying such proceeds to support
the wife. In the case of a bank account, the proper procedure would probably be to employ the injunction as was
done in the Pennington case.' The Court's language seems
to make it fairly clear, at least, that merely describing the
property specifically in the bill of complaint and in the
published summons will not be sufficient to give a court
jurisdiction over the property. The position taken by our
Court of Appeals in the matter is directly in conformity
with that taken by the New York Court of Appeals, and
therefore we may well look to past decisions of that Court
in seeking more concrete examples of the procedure that
is most adaptable to the various factual situations that may
arise.
iSdupra, n. 5.

